Also Written By: Janvi Patidar | Legal & Current Affairs Faculty
The Landmark Judgments 2025–2026 for CLAT PG include major Constitution Bench rulings on gubernatorial assent and arbitral award modification. These decisions clarify Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution and Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Below is a structured and exam-oriented analysis for Landmark Judgments 2025–2026 for CLAT PG.
IN RE: ASSENT, WITHHOLDING OR RESERVATION OF BILLS BY THE GOVERNOR AND THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA
SPL. REF. No. 1/2025
Nature of Proceedings
The President of India made a reference to the Supreme Court under Article 143(1) of the Constitution. The Court examined constitutional questions concerning Articles 200 and 201.
Factual Background
The reference followed the decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025). In that case, the Court made observations on the Governor’s powers under Article 200. Subsequently, doubts arose about consistency with earlier Constitution Bench rulings. Therefore, the President referred fourteen questions to remove constitutional uncertainty.
Although parties questioned the maintainability of the reference, the Court upheld it. The Bench stated that constitutional clarity justified answering the questions.
Questions Referred
The reference addressed the following issues:
- What options does the Governor have under Article 200?
- Must the Governor follow the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers?
- Can courts review actions under Articles 200 and 201?
- May courts impose timelines when the Constitution remains silent?
- Is “deemed assent” constitutionally valid?
- Can Article 142 override constitutional procedures?
- Does a Bill become law without assent?
Decision of the Court
The Constitution Bench gave a structured opinion.
First, the Governor has three constitutional options under Article 200:
- Grant assent.
- Reserve the Bill for the President.
- Return the Bill (if not a Money Bill) for reconsideration.
Second, the Governor does not act strictly under ministerial aid and advice when exercising powers under Article 200. However, the Governor must give due regard to that advice.
Third, courts cannot examine the merits of assent or reservation decisions. Nevertheless, if prolonged and unexplained inaction occurs, courts may direct the authority to act within a reasonable time.
Fourth, Article 361 protects the Governor from personal legal proceedings. Yet, this immunity does not bar limited judicial review of constitutional inaction
Fifth, courts cannot prescribe timelines because Articles 200 and 201 contain none.
Sixth, the doctrine of “deemed assent” has no constitutional basis.
Seventh, a State Bill does not become law unless the Governor grants assent.
Finally, Article 142 cannot replace or override the constitutional role of the Governor or President.
Reasons for the Opinion
1. Scope of Article 200
The Court examined the text and provisos of Article 200. It held that the provisos limit the Governor’s choices rather than expand them. For example, in the case of a Money Bill, the Governor cannot return the Bill for reconsideration. Thus, the Constitution creates a structured legislative dialogue.
2. Discretion and Aid and Advice
The Court relied on Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State of M.P., and Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker. These precedents clarify that the Governor ordinarily follows ministerial advice. However, the context of Article 200 allows limited discretion.
Importantly, the Court rejected two extremes. The Governor is neither a parallel executive authority nor a mere ceremonial figure in legislative matters.
3. Timelines and Deemed Assent
The Constitution does not specify any time limit for assent. Therefore, the Court held that this silence is deliberate. Judges cannot insert timelines through interpretation.
Similarly, the Court rejected “deemed assent.” When the Constitution intends a deeming fiction, it says so explicitly. Consequently, courts cannot create one.
The Court reaffirmed Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala and disapproved earlier attempts to judicially introduce timelines.
4. Justiciability and Article 361
The Court drew a clear distinction between merits review and process review. Courts cannot question why the Governor withheld assent. However, if the Governor keeps a Bill pending indefinitely without explanation, courts may require action.
Thus, Article 361 grants personal immunity but does not create constitutional immunity from scrutiny in cases of inaction.
Ratio Decidendi
The Governor’s powers under Article 200 and the President’s powers under Article 201 are discretionary within constitutional limits. Courts cannot review the merits of those decisions or impose timelines. However, courts may intervene in cases of prolonged and unexplained inaction to ensure discharge of constitutional duty.
GAYATRI BALASAMY v. M/S ISG NOVASOFT TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED
Civil Appeal No. 6178–6179 of 2025
Nature of Proceedings
This appeal raised questions about the power of courts under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court also examined whether Article 142 allows modification of arbitral awards.
Factual Background
The appellant initiated criminal proceedings alleging sexual harassment. Later, the dispute went to arbitration upon a Supreme Court reference. The Arbitral Tribunal awarded ₹2 crores in compensation.
The appellant challenged the award under Section 34 before the Madras High Court. The Single Judge increased compensation by ₹1.6 crores. However, the Division Bench reduced that enhancement to ₹50,000 under Section 37.
Because courts across India had taken conflicting views on modification powers, the Supreme Court referred the matter to a Constitution Bench.
Questions for Determination
- Do courts have power to modify arbitral awards?
- Does the power to set aside include partial modification?
- Can Article 142 justify modification on merits?
Majority Decision (4:1)
The majority held that courts possess a limited power to modify arbitral awards.
First, the power to set aside includes the power to partially set aside when the valid and invalid parts are severable.
Second, courts may correct or modify post-award interest in limited circumstances.
Third, Article 142 cannot be used to rewrite an award on merits.
Justice Viswanathan dissented and rejected any modification power.
Majority Reasoning
1. Doctrine of Severability
Section 34(2)(a)(iv) contains a proviso reflecting severability. Therefore, when an award contains a defective part that stands apart from the valid part, the court may strike down only the defective portion.
The majority applied the principle that a greater power includes the lesser. Since courts can set aside the whole award, they can also partially set it aside.
2. Limited Modification Power
The 1996 Act promotes minimal judicial interference and speedy resolution. If courts lacked limited modification power, parties would face repeated arbitration or remand. That outcome would defeat legislative intent.
However, the Court imposed strict limits. Modification is permissible only when:
- The defective portion is clearly severable.
- The court does not re-evaluate evidence.
- The court does not substitute its own factual conclusions.
Thus, Section 34 does not convert courts into appellate bodies.
3. Modification vs Remand
Section 34(4) allows courts to remit the matter to the tribunal to cure defects. Remand differs from modification. While remand sends the matter back, modification operates only where correction does not require fresh adjudication.
Courts may correct clerical or computational errors. However, they cannot rewrite substantive findings.
4. Post-Award Interest
The majority allowed modification of post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) when manifest injustice would otherwise result. Since post-award interest operates prospectively, limited correction does not disturb arbitral findings.
5. Article 142
Although Article 142 empowers the Court to do complete justice, it cannot override statutory limitations. Therefore, the Court cannot invoke Article 142 to conduct a merits-based reassessment of the award.
Dissenting Opinion
Justice Viswanathan disagreed.
He noted that Section 34 expressly mentions only “setting aside.” The 1996 Act deliberately removed the broader modification powers present in the 1940 Act. Therefore, legislative intent excludes modification.
He also rejected the “greater includes lesser” argument. Section 34 proceedings are supervisory, not appellate. Any modification would undermine party autonomy.
Finally, he held that Article 142 cannot circumvent statutory limits.
Ratio Decidendi
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 includes a narrow power to partially set aside or modify an arbitral award when the defective portion is severable and correction does not require re-adjudication on merits. Courts cannot use Article 142 to rewrite arbitral awards contrary to the statutory framework.
Also Read: https://vidhigya.com/blog/legal-current-affairs-february-2026/
